Hooghe, L., Marks, G. (2015). Delegation and pooling in international organizations. Review of International Organizations, 10 (3), 305-328. “International lawyers (and international governance students) note that this book is one of the most important contributions to date in the growing interaction between international relations and international law. Barbara Koremenos shows how states carefully organize and apply the technical provisions of contracts, from duration to monitoring to accuracy, in order to address incentives, constraints and characteristics of actors. The book, an analytical Tour of Force, sheds new light on legalized cooperation. “The book contains many elements that, in one way or another, can be used for the analysis of international law in the two polar regions. … The continent of international law should be an integral part of the analysis of the development of the polar law and contribute to the understanding of the polar legal dynamics and the behaviour of the actors. “The continent of international law is an informative and stimulating analysis of treaty writing. Koremenos highlights the rich diversity of international agreements and highlights procedural clauses often buried behind the backs of treaties that many scholars, government officials and lawyers neglect. The theoretical contributions of the book are as important as the abundant empirical data it provides.
A Tour de Force of the rational design scholarship. Pevehouse, J.C., Nordstrom, T., Warnke, K. (2004). The correlates of the war 2 international government organizations Data 2.0. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21 (2), 101-119. Each year, states negotiate, conclude, sign and suspend hundreds of new international agreements. Mr Koremenos argued that the detailed provisions of these agreements were important for the phenomena that scientists, policy makers and public opinion were on track to make: when and how international cooperation was established and maintained. In theory, Koremenos develops hypotheses on how to combat and moderate cooperation problems such as incentives for fraud through the detailed provisions of the law. It empirically exploits its data set, which consists of a random sample of international agreements on the economy, environment, human rights and security. Their theory and examination lead to a coherent discovery: in the face of the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation is more legislative than anarchic, the detailed provisions of international law being chosen in such a way as to increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation.